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Political Elites in the USA under George W. Bush  
and Barack Obama: Structure and  
International Politics 
Oxana Gaman-Golutvina ∗ 
Abstract: »Die politischen Eliten in den USA unter George W. Bush und Barack 
Obama: Struktur und Außenpolitik«. The article is devoted to a comparison of 
different U.S. administrations’ foreign policy in the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury. This period was chosen because it appears to be a critical moment in 
American history. The analysis shows that, despite the differences in party ad-
herence and other ideological affiliations, successive administrations tend to 
follow identical or similar guidelines while implementing foreign policy. The 
author suggests several possible reasons for this continuity. First, there is the 
stability of the institutional and decision-making systems and mechanisms, 
which, in turn, are based on a stable system of interest representation. More 
broadly, it is the persistent system of values and basic attitudes, political and 
philosophical traditions, ideology and long-term behavioral patterns – those 
phenomena forming the core of political culture – that are the most important 
non-institutional factors driving the continuity of American foreign policy. So, 
comparison of the foreign policy courses of the Bush and Obama administra-
tions leads to the conclusion that the mechanism of U.S. foreign policy is im-
personal to a great extent. The key biographical parameters of the politicians 
play an only limited role in defining their political course. 
Keywords: Political elites, foreign policy, strategic decisions, political power, 
military might. 
1.  Focus, Research Question, Hypothesis, Approach 
The United States is the most powerful actor in world politics and will remain 
so for the foreseeable future, despite the serious challenges that it faces. Hence 
the importance of understanding the factors that determine contemporary 
American foreign policy and the dominant approaches of the key figures in-
volved in its formation and execution.  
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It is too early to assess the presidency of Donald J. Trump, not least because 
there has been a lot of turnover in the senior ranks of the Trump administration. 
However, some patterns emerged during the first one and a half years of his 
presidency. Each of the past three presidents – Bush, Obama, and Trump – 
were not typical for the American political tradition (albeit for various reasons), 
and it was not by chance that each of them came to the White House as a radi-
cal critic of his predecessors. Bush went down in history as the author of a 
“militant” presidency; Obama – the first African American to hold the office of 
president – was elected at a critical period, as a crisis manager in domestic 
affairs and peacekeeper in foreign policy; and Trump entered the White House 
as an outsider pledged to “drain the swamp” in Washington, and who faced 
investigations that critics hoped would lead to his impeachment. The beginning 
of the 21st century is a critical period of American history – not only because 
of the events of 9/11, but also because it became increasingly clear that the 
global leadership of the United States that was acquired after the Cold War had 
entered a phase of protracted crisis. 
The U.S. foreign policy elite pool is quite wide and includes not only the 
key officials but also influential think tank fellows, some corporate actors, the 
security community, mass media, lobbying groups of various natures, and 
others. This paper deals with the core of the U.S. foreign policy elite, which 
comprises politicians, policy experts, and the officials in charge of making U.S. 
foreign policy.  
The article aims to research the factors that determine the formation of dom-
inating approaches and attitudes of the key figures that make U.S. foreign poli-
cy, through a comparison of the core foreign policy elites during the Bush-
Junior and Obama presidencies. 
As a hypothesis, it can be assumed that among the determining factors are 
the following: the career paths, personal characteristics, and personal experience 
of politicians; their ideological/religious beliefs; the interest groups having 
opportunity to influence political decision-making; the mechanism of making 
foreign policy decisions inside complicated political systems; public opinion 
and mass media that shape perceptions of foreign policy.  
The beginning of the 21th century represents the culmination of the “Amer-
ican century” that began in the wake of World War One. The end of the Cold 
War was the peak of U.S. power: for the first time in its history the country 
gained the status of sole superpower. At that point, the attitudes of the U.S. 
political elite determined not only American foreign policy, but also the content 
and main trends of world politics.  
The foreign policy attitudes and orientations of the U.S. political elite rested 
on an updated version of the American “mission” and “predestination of desti-
ny,” which had played a significant role since the founding of the republic. By 
the early 21st century, however, it was clear that the U.S. faced a number of 
serious challenges – a weaker economy (the lingering effects of the crisis of 
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2008-2009, large debts of all types, China’s growing economic power, etc.); 
military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria; difficulties in relations 
with its allies and partners; and anti-Americanism in various world regions. As 
the veteran of American foreign policy Henry Kissinger noted, in the apogee of 
its power the U.S. found itself in an ambiguous situation: in the face of the 
most profound turmoil that the world has ever faced, they were not able to offer 
ideas adequate to the new reality (Kissinger 2001, ch.1). 
Examining the Bush and Obama administrations also provides a comparison 
of the foreign policy approaches of Republicans and Democrats. Opinions 
differ on the extent to which partisanship affects U.S. foreign policy making. 
Looking back at many years of research, the Chicago Council on Global Af-
fairs concluded in 2012 that “Democrats and Republicans are very similar in 
their views on foreign policy,” while Peter Gries, the author of the book The 
Politics of American Foreign Policy: How Ideology Divides Liberals and Con-
servatives over Foreign Affairs, argues that “to claim that partisanship does not 
affect American foreign policy would be a consequential mistake” (Gries 2014, 
8).  
2.  Essential Characteristics of Recruitment Key Figures 
The most important foreign policy decisions in the United States are made 
within the consultative councils under the President (National Security Council, 
the Council of Homeland Security, and the Council for International Economic 
Policy). Accordingly, the U.S. elite core in terms of foreign policy-making 
includes the permanent members of these councils. The “Big Four” of the 
Cabinet are the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, and Justice, along with 
the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the Director of National Intelligence, the President’s chief of staff, the Advisor 
to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Vice-President are also 
involved in making strategic foreign policy decisions. 
This article examines the biographies of all the people who occupied the 
five key positions of the Cabinet (the Secretary of State, Defense, Treasury, 
Justice, and Homeland Security) during the period 2001-2014, according to the 
following parameters: age, place of birth, education, religion, party affiliation, 
and career chronology (including military service and business interests).1 In 
total the biographies of all 61 representatives were considered: 34 from the 
Bush administrations and 27 from the Obama administrations. According to 
historical tradition in the United States, recruitment is realized through such 
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institutional channels as political parties, the education system, business activi-
ty, the army, and others. Belonging to an influential family also sometimes 
facilitates political promotion. 
The analysis revealed the following trends: 
First. The average age of the officials when they took office in the admin-
istrations of Barack Obama and George Bush Jr. was identical in both Cabinets 
and amounted to 59 years. The lowest was the average age of the Ministers of 
Homeland Security – 54 years. The average age of the Attorney General and 
the Minister of Finance when they took office was 58 years, the Secretary of 
State – 61, the Minister of Defense – 67.2 In comparison with Clinton’s admin-
istrations, the average age of the inner circles of Barack Obama and George 
Bush Jr. increased by five years; in comparison with Ronald Reagan’s admin-
istrations – by three years; in comparison with George Bush’s Sr. Cabinet – by 
a year (Orlov 2001). In general, over the past 50 years, the “aging” of the 
inner circle of the President was almost 15 years – compared to the presidency 
of John F. Kennedy, when the average age of the team was 45 years (Garbuzov 
2003). So, the politicians of Bush Jr. and Obama were socialized during the 
Cold War period, and one can surmise that their personal views to a great 
extent were shaped by the black and white realities of that time.  
Second, the political elites maintained their relative homogeneity in spite of 
the significant differences in the declared political course of the Republicans 
and Democrats: biographical analysis of both Barack Obama administrations 
and those of George W. Bush does not reveal systematic differences.  
Third, a comparison of the impact of different promotion channels (political 
parties, government agencies, businesses, religious organizations, the army, 
etc.) shows the dominant role of the education system (with a prominent role 
for Ivy League universities; and more than half of the members were holders of 
a doctoral degree), while the role of such channels as family and religious 
affiliation has been falling. The majority of the observed group had public 
service experience prior to their Cabinet appointment. One third of Bush ap-
pointees previously belonged to the presidential advisers’ pool; others had 
recent experience in the federal government, business, regional institutions, 
academia, and the military. 
A distinctive feature of the Obama Cabinets was the presence of some Re-
publicans representatives in the immediate presidential circle – notably the 
Defense Secretaries Robert Gates (in the first Administration) and Chuck Hagel 
(during the second Administration). Almost one in six in the overall group 
possessed military service experience. 
Career path is not necessarily a secure guide to political attitudes and dispo-
sitions. For example, General Colin Powell (Secretary of State 2001-05) was a 
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career military officer yet he is attributed by most experts to the “doves” camp, 
while civilians such as assistant Secretary of Defense in 2001-03 Richard Perle 
and Paul Woldowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2001-05, lobbied for a 
sharp increase of military spending from three to four percent of the GDP in the 
first Bush administration. Neither Wolfowitz nor Perle had completed any mili-
tary service. 
Opposite to the examples of Wolfowitz and Perle is Chuck Hagel, a former 
Republican, who was Secretary of Defense in the Obama administration in 
2013-2015. Hagel had served as an infantry sergeant in Vietnam, where he was 
wounded twice. He was an early Republican critic of the Iraq war and a harsh 
opponent of the Bush administration. In his reckoning, it was the “the most 
arrogant, incompetent administrations [he had] ever seen or ever read about”; it 
was led by men “whose intransigency was unmatched by a personal record of 
military service” (Akers and Kane 2007). He believed there was no military 
solution to the problems of Iraq and Afghanistan. Hagel repeatedly demonstrat-
ed a preference for compromise over the use of force. He was convinced that 
the long-term U.S. security interests hinged on alliances, coalitions, interna-
tional institutions, and the U.S. reputation in the world, as well as to correct 
assessment of the limits of U.S. power. “Hagel was conscious of the limits of 
American power and could serve as a potential check on militarism in a manner 
career bureaucrats like Leon Panetta never could” (Idrees Ahmad 2012).  
3. Ideological Divisions within the American Foreign 
Policy Elite 
An important point for the analysis of the U.S. political community structure is 
party affiliation. Peter Gries (2014) argues that within a broad value consensus, 
American liberals and conservatives differ on cultural, economic, social, and 
political issues.  
3.1  The Republicans 
Experts distinguish four main groups within the Republican Party on the basis 
of the foreign policy views of its representatives.  
Libertarians. When an active group of libertarians emerged inside the Re-
publican Party in the beginning of the 1990s, many of its members were former 
members of the Libertarian Party. The Libertarian segment of the Republican 
Party is an ideological successor of conservative isolationists. A new round of 
interventionism clearly manifested itself in the American foreign policy in the 
early 1990s and early 2000s, drew sharp criticism from the libertarian camp. 
Libertarians believed that America was wasting its resources trying to play the 
role of a “global sheriff,” so they persistently lobbied for reduction of U.S. 
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international obligations. During the first of Obama’s terms in 2008-2011, 
libertarians significantly strengthened their political position in the Republican 
Party. Those arguing for a “more restrained” foreign policy included for exam-
ple former congressman Rand Paul, now a senator. The most influential Liber-
tarian “think tank” is the Cato Institute.  
The conservative realists. This group includes people with extensive foreign 
policy experience in previous Republican administrations. On one hand, they 
still see the U.S. as a genuine superpower with global interests, who must play 
the role of leader of the international system. However, despite the U.S. superi-
ority over the other leading world powers, they are not the only center of power 
and they cannot solve the problems and answer global challenges alone. Amer-
ica needs to match its goals with its available resources. This means that the 
U.S. should limit its military presence to the countries and regions of its vital 
interests (Europe, Middle East, Japan); and should prevent the emergence of a 
regional hegemony in any part of the world using mostly diplomatic and eco-
nomic methods. Among the well-known conservative realists are foreign policy 
patriarchs Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, and George Shultz, as well as 
experts Paul Saunders and Dmitry Simes of The National Interest Center (for-
merly The Nixon Center).  
Right conservatives advocate preserving U.S. military superiority, preferring 
to rely on the traditional system of U.S. military and political alliances that was 
built during the Cold War, and using hard rather than soft power. Most right 
conservatives are not unilateralist and consider it important to maintain cooper-
ation with allies. They do not approve a “crusade” for global democratization 
as a priority American foreign policy. Among the prominent right conserva-
tives are Condoleezza Rice, Senators Jon Kyle and John McCain, and political 
scientists Kim Holmes and Ariel Cohen. The largest right-wing conservative 
research centers are Heritage Foundation and the Hoover Institution on War, 
Revolution and Peace.  
The Neoconservatives. Having emerged as a group in the 1970s, this group 
borrowed from liberal circles an idealistic emphasis on the “uniqueness” of the 
U.S. role in the world. Neocons joined this idealism with the conservative 
adherence to hard power. They consider the U.S. to be the only actor in the 
world responsible for the promotion of liberal-democratic ideas, and defend the 
need to change undemocratic regimes by any means – as evidenced by their 
active lobbying for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Unlike right conservatives, neo-
cons do not think that the U.S. must rely on assistance from European and other 
allies. Among the well-known neoconservative figures are former Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, former U.S. permanent representative to the U.N. 
and currently Presidential National Security Advisor John Bolton, former em-
ployees of the Defense Department Wolfowitz and Perle, and writers Robert 
Kagan and William Kristol. The most prominent neo-conservative think tanks are 
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the American Enterprise Institute, and the “New American Century Project,” 
which existed in 1997-2006 (Woodward 2002; Mann 2004; Tarelin 2012). 
3.2  The Democrats 
It is possible to distinguish three main groups within the Democratic Party on 
the basis of the foreign policy views of its representatives. 
The liberal interventionists that are also known as the “liberal hawks” or 
“hard” Democrats, the right wing of the Democratic Party. They are in favor of 
maintaining U.S. global leadership, considering it necessary to promote liberal 
ideas by all means, even by force. For them, it is important to preserve the 
leading role of the U.S. in international organizations. They support an increase 
of the country’s military budget and the use of force to maintain order in key 
regions of the world. Many liberal interventionists occupied key positions in 
Clinton’s second administration and had a significant impact on hardening the 
U.S. approach to relations with Russia. By “liberal hawks” we mean figures 
such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Madeleine Albright, and Richard Holbrooke. The 
most prestigious think tank with a predominant influence of the liberal inter-
ventionists is the Council on Foreign Relations. Many liberal interventionists 
are also members of the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.  
The liberal internationalists. Liberal internationalists are the left wing of the 
Democratic Party. Being the main heirs of traditional “idealists,” liberal inter-
nationalists believe that respect for human rights and international law should 
be the foundation of international relations. Liberal internationalists believe 
that the U.S. should spend a significant deal of its might and resources for 
maintenance and development of the international order. In their view, the U.S. 
should not act alone, nor oppose itself to other states or go into a conservative 
isolationism. Liberal internationalists oppose the indiscriminate use of military 
force as the main instrument for foreign policy implementation, but do support 
intervention to stop gross violations of human rights. Liberal internationalists 
include such figures as former U.N. ambassador Samantha Power, former U.S. 
ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, Director of Policy Planning in the State 
Department in Obama administration Anne-Marie M. Slaughter, and her aca-
demic husband Andrew Moravcsik. 
Liberal realists are the moderate center of the Democratic Party. Being typical 
liberals and defending the primacy of liberal values and international law, they 
favor a more flexible, pragmatic approach to international relations. Liberal 
realists tend to borrow elements of conservative realists’ foreign policy settings. 
Liberal realists oppose forcible promoting the American democracy model 
outside its borders. They stand up for negotiation – even with unfriendly re-
gimes. Among the prominent liberal realists – Barack Obama, former senator 
Sam Nunn, political scientists Robert Legvold, Andrew Kuchins, Charles Kup-
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chan, and Angela Stent. Liberal realists work in a number of leading think 
tanks, among them – the Brookings Institute, the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (for more 
details see Tarelin 2012).  
While considering all aforementioned ideological circles, one can note the 
functional heterogeneity of all these groups – they include both practical politi-
cians and NGO (think tank) fellows. Among the most influential institutions in 
terms of participating in foreign policy developing are five institutions – the 
Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, the RAND Corporation, and the 
Council on Foreign Relations. Among the fellows of these NGOs are former 
employees of presidential administrations, intelligence agencies, and business 
corporations. Think tank participation in foreign policy elaboration is realized 
through two main mechanisms. The first implies that think tanks act as an 
external actor that promoting some proposals for decision makers. In the sec-
ond case, NGOs are directly involved in the political process and submit ana-
lytical papers for the most significant U.S. government agencies. 
4.  The Bush Elite: Is It Really an Aberration? 
John Higley, a prominent scholar of political elites, argued that the team of 
Bush Jr. was essentially different from the U.S. typical elite model (Higley 
2006). In terms of structure the American elite has usually been fragmented 
and pluralistic. Meanwhile George W. Bush’s team was exceptionally cohe-
sive: it was highly integrated and well organized; the key figures knew each 
other well before coming to power in 2000. They were united by shared politi-
cal and ethical principles, and by views on the U.S. role in the world and on 
international policy issues. Their views were formatted in an extremely ambi-
tious program that was developed long before the dramatic events of 9/11, 
which opened an opportunity for implementing this program. The core of the 
elite was constituted by numerous members of the big Bush family and the 
most trusted and close advisers. As the most important centers, Higley singled 
out the following circles: neoconservatives, nationalists, democratic imperialists, 
and conservatives of the old school. The neoconservatives became the most 
influential, and their views formed the basis for Bush foreign policy.  
The inner core, dubbed “Vulcans” by critics, consisted of Dick Cheney, 
Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis Libby, Condoleeza 
Rice, Steven Hadley and others (Higley 2006; Mann 2004; Chernykch 2003). 
The influence of the “Vulcans” substantially grew after Bush’s reelection in 
2004, when politicians such as General Colin Powell and officials in State 
Department and CIA who were deemed insufficiently loyal, were removed and 
replaced by unconditional loyalists (Higley 2006). 
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Bush’s strategic program, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces 
and Resources for a New Century (published in 2000 by a neo-conservative 
think tank, the Project for the New American Century) was based on ideas that 
were developed since the early 1990s. After 2001, much of the program was 
realized: the USSR-U.S. 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was canceled; the 
regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq was overthrown; a lot of efforts were made 
to destabilize the regimes in Iran and North Korea; preparation for the deploy-
ment of the new missiles defense system in Europe was launched; and the 
military budget was increased from three to four percent of the GDP. The Na-
tional Security Strategy adopted in 2002 implied a rejection of the containment 
strategy as a Cold War relic and legitimized the possibility of preventive strikes 
against the countries that could potentially pose a threat to the U.S. It pledged 
the extension of the U.S. military bases around the world to prevent the 
achievement by any country of equality or superiority to the U.S. in military 
power (Higley 2006).  
One more direction of the implementation of strategic guidelines for unilat-
eral global superiority was the expansion of U.S. influence in the post-soviet 
space that began under Bush – previously this region remained beyond the U.S. 
interests. Some color revolutions took place in the post-soviet space – in Geor-
gia in 2003, in Ukraine in 2004-05, in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. A similar attempt, 
that failed, took place in Uzbekistan in 2005. American influence over events 
in Ukraine had a personal dimension: the wife of Ukrainian president Viktor 
Yushchenko (who was actively supported by the U.S.) was American citizen 
Ekaterina Chumachenko. Before marriage, Chumachenko worked in the office 
of the Deputy Secretary of State, as Deputy Chairman of the Public Relations 
Office in the White House, in the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. Congress. The 
former head of president Yushchenko’s administration, Viktor V. Baloha, 
testified that Yushchenko did not take any meaningful decision without Chu-
machenko’s approval (Baloga 2009). 
It would seem that the highly cohesive Bush team, with a scrupulously 
planned strategic program and an aggressive commitment to its implementa-
tion, should have succeeded in its foreign policy mission. However, the Bush 
presidency failed on many fronts: from the defeat in military campaigns in Iraq 
and Afghanistan to the deep economic crisis that began in 2008.3 Bush’s last 
year in office was overshadowed by the economic crisis which represented a 
profound shift also in global politics, signaling the failure of the international 
institutions that the U.S. had crafted to regulate the global economy (Best and 
Higley 2014). These critical circumstances help explain the rise to the presi-
dency of the African-American Barack Obama: he seemed to represent an 
                                                             
3  To be fair, it should be noted that economic dynamics has its own logic and sources, and is 
not always the result of political leadership failures. 
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extraordinary response to an extraordinary crisis. Obama found himself playing 
the role of a crisis manager. 
Obama’s domestic policy kept to the traditional line of favoring corporate 
business interests. The Obama administration bailed out the “sacred cows” of 
Wall Street and flooded the economy with government money. Obama’s main 
domestic accomplishment was reforming the health care system (“Obamacare”), 
which extended medical insurance for about 30 million Americans who had 
previously been without coverage. 
As to foreign policy, Obama was sharply critical of Bush’s strategy, which 
he saw as based on the utopianism of the unipolar world, the “new American 
age” concepts and Bush’s unconditional stake on military force. Obama had to 
handle a number of critical issues, including the withdrawal of troops from Iraq 
and Afghanistan, preventing Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear 
weapons, restoring collaboration with the Arab world and “resetting” relations 
with Russia. The complexity, multiplicity, and multidimensionality of the 
challenges seemed to demand a radical break with the traditional foreign policy 
approaches. 
Indeed, Obama’s presidency got off to a promising start. Obama announced 
his intention to substantially reduce the U.S. military budget and his unwilling-
ness to fight two wars simultaneously. With reference to U.S. policy in the 
post-soviet space, a declaration to remove the accession of Georgia and 
Ukraine to NATO from the agenda was appreciated by Moscow, which sup-
ported Washington in a number of its sensitive issues. 
The conviction of the global community in Obama’s peacekeeping prospec-
tive (and his own intentions to pursue a peace-loving policy as opposed to 
Bush's militant course) was so strong that it led the Nobel Committee to award 
Obama the Nobel Peace Prize in advance of his expected actions, an unprece-
dented step. 
Observers disagree about how to assess Obama’s foreign policy. Some 
scholars believe that his policy corresponded to the ideas of Wilson’s liberal 
internationalism. According to other experts (Palacio 2016), Obama’s foreign 
policy does not fit into any of the four main foreign policy paradigms that were 
identified by Walter Russell Mead, who named them Hamiltonians (mercan-
tilism), Jeffersonians (isolationism), Jacksonians (militarism) and Wilsonians 
(liberal internationalism) (Mead 2002). 
Two key ideas constituted the “Obama doctrine.” First, it was a denial of the 
widespread thesis of America’s inevitable decline, resisting it by all means, 
including a new emphasis on multilateral partnership. Second, it was about 
shifting the emphasis in achieving foreign policy goals from military force to 
diplomacy. This shift in the methods of foreign policy implementation was 
captured by Joseph Nye in his multidimensional idea of smart power – that is, 
the skillful integration of both soft and hard power (which includes both mili-
tary force and economic strength) (Nye 2009, 2011). So, the principal differ-
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ence between the foreign policies of Bush and Obama was the recognition by 
Obama of the vulnerability of the unilateralism strategy, and the need for coop-
erative interaction with allies. Under Bush the main diplomatic agency was the 
Pentagon, while under Obama the State Department regained its legally pre-
scribed status as the key institution of foreign policy. 
Among the key achievements of Obama’s foreign policy were the curtail-
ment of unsuccessful wars in Iraq (in December 2011 the end of the military 
operation was announced) and Afghanistan (in late 2014 the U.S. and other 
NATO countries announced the completion of their “combat mission”). The 
aspiration to restore relations with the Arab world (Obama’s speech at Cairo 
University in June 2009 became symbolic) was undoubtedly also important. Of 
course, we should mention the limitation of nuclear weapons proliferation by 
reaching the historic agreement that was signed in Geneva in 2013 between 
Iran and the six international mediators, which confirmed the peaceful nature of 
Iran’s nuclear program. Important steps were taken to improve relations with 
European allies. An attempt was made to restart relations with Russia: in April 
2010 Russia and the U.S. signed a new treaty on strategic arms limitation 
(START III), which envisaged a mutual reduction of nuclear arsenals by almost a 
third. The refusal of the U.S. administration to deploy anti-ballistic missile 
defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic was announced. In response, 
Russia took an unprecedented step in opening a transit air corridor for NATO 
flights to Afghanistan across Russian territory. Through this corridor almost 20 
percent of all shipments to and from Afghanistan were delivered. Last but not 
least – American-Cuban relations were normalized. So, notwithstanding the 
neocons’ criticism of Obama for his “softness” and “pacifism excesses” and 
despite the disagreements within the White House itself (Mann 2012) Obama 
managed to achieve substantial results during his first term in office. 
5. Obama’s Second Term: Forward to the Past? 
But in Obama’s second term the accents were substantially changed: he clearly 
drifted towards an offensive foreign policy vector, and a renewed emphasis on 
maintaining the U.S.’s globally dominant position. This shift is evident in the 
State Department’s Strategic Plan for 2014-2017.4 Its main goal was promoting 
democracy without recognition of any alternatives, and a reaffirmation of 
American values. The plan called for the promotion of democratization in 25-30 
countries around the world. The fact that the document contains the same 
guidelines for promotion of democracy that inspired Republicans, indicates a 
                                                             
4  Strategic Plan FY 2014-2017: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/223997.pdf> 
(Accessed December 1, 2017).  
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high degree of dogmatism of the U.S. foreign policy elite, regardless of its 
party profile.  
Having stated at the beginning of the first presidency his rejection of the 
Bush administration’s commitment to regime change, Obama later eventually 
returned to this practice in a number of regions. Under Obama, the U.S. con-
ducted military operations in Libya and Syria. Regarding Libya, Obama later 
said “At that time I thought it was right,” but admitted that failing to plan for 
the aftermath of President Gaddafi’s removal from power was the “worst mis-
take” of his presidency (Guardian 2016). In relations with Russia, the Secretary 
Hilary Clinton gave to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov the button titled 
“reset”, that symbolized the US intention to re-start the dialogue with Russia. 
But the title of the button contained a grammatical mistake: it meant 
“перегрузка” (meaning “overloaded”) instead of “перезагрузка” (“reset”). 
This seemed to symbolize the lack of understanding of Russia’s position. The 
U.S. still seemed set on limiting Europe’s dependence on Russian energy and 
pushing it out from arms export markets. In 2012, the Senate, having canceled 
the Jackson-Vanik amendment (a measure dating back to 1974, which restrict-
ed Russia’s trade status), went on to replace it with the Magnitsky Act, sanc-
tioning individuals accused of human rights violations in Russia. The U.S. 
administration revived plans for deploying missile defense systems in Poland, 
Romania, Turkey and even in Alaska and Japan. At the end of Obama’s second 
term, U.S.-Russian relations had arguably reached the most critical level since 
1945, comparable only with the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The U.S. supported 
the E.U.’s Eastern Partnership program promoting closer cooperation with six 
post-soviet states, treating them as a counterweight to Russia and ignoring 
Russia’s vital interests in the region. Obama also continued the policy of sup-
porting the “color revolutions” in the post-soviet space. The U.S. played a 
particularly significant role in Ukrainian politics, supporting the Maidan revo-
lution that toppled President Viktor Yanukovich in 2014. Michael McFaul, an 
academic, who was a strong advocate of promoting democracy around the 
world (McFaul 2009), was appointed as Obama’s Presidential Advisor on 
Russia in 2009-2012 and as ambassador in Moscow in 2012-2014. The senior 
official handling Ukraine in the State Department was Victoria Nuland. A 
frequent visitor to Ukraine, Nuland supervised the formation of the first post-
Maidan government in Kiev. Senator John McCain also appeared in Kiev with 
speeches on Maidan. The U.S. Vice-President Joseph Biden became the most 
senior U.S. supervisor of Ukrainian affairs. As he frankly admitted: “I think we 
may have logged close to 1,000 hours on the telephone. I think I tend to be 
more in direct conversation for longer periods of time with the president than 
with my wife. I think they both regret that” […]” (Podgornyi 2017). In Decem-
ber 2015, Biden became the first high-ranking U.S. official to deliver a speech 
in the Ukrainian parliament. He even made decisions concerning potential 
correction of the Ukrainian Constitution in January 2016 (Korrespondent.net 
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2016). It is worth noting that Hunter Biden, the son of the U.S. Vice-President, 
is a board member of the largest private Ukrainian oil and gas company 
“Burisma.” 
Of course, we should not ignore the differences between Bush’s and 
Obama’s policies – for example, in dealing with Israel – but these differences 
were more in style than substance. Bush’s neocons were replaced by Obama’s 
liberal internationalists and liberal interventionists (sometimes called liberal 
hawks). So, despite the changes in personal composition and ideological profile 
of the White House team, foreign policy in the final term of Obama’s presiden-
cy returned to the traditional settings. It is rather symbolic that Victoria Nuland 
is married to the famous proponent of neo-conservatism Robert Kagan, who 
prefers the term “liberal interventionist” to describe himself (Horowitz 2014). 
So, eventually the Obama administration found itself committed to the fun-
damental approaches of Bush era: the U.S. should maintain its global leader-
ship in shaping a new geopolitical order; military superiority is the main factor 
in ensuring the U.S. global domination, and the armed forces should remain the 
basis of national might. 
In this context, it is worth looking at Donald Trump’s political evolution 
during his first year in office. Trump came to the White House as an outsider 
promising to “drain the Washington swamp.” He initiated a number of steps 
that undoubtedly looked like a pronounced departure from previous political 
traditions, including publically questioning the relevance of NATO and the 
reliability of the U.S.’s European allies. Trump unilaterally withdrew from 
some of the signature achievements of the Obama administration: the 2015 
Paris climate change agreement; the nuclear deal with Iran; and the negotia-
tions for a Trans-Pacific Partnership that was signed in February 2016 by 
Obama. Trump tried (and failed) to abolish “Obamacare” and devoted a lot of 
attention to the question of immigration, declaring his intention to expel 11 
million illegal immigrants from the country and to build a wall on the border 
with Mexico. He also struck down many of Obama’s presidential directives and 
memorandums on environmental policy, civil rights, and other issues. So, one 
can define his course as strikingly unlike that of his predecessors. 
Trump found himself in a vocal and vigorous conflict with the establishment 
(numerous conflicts with the media, the judiciary, FBI, the State Department). 
The political intensity was exacerbated by deep rifts within the Trump admin-
istration, which resulted in the departure of many key officials within his first 
presidential year. Towards the end of his first year, Trump seemed to shift 
towards more mainstream attitudes such as an emphasis on the use of military 
force. Under the pressure of the establishment, Trump reconsidered his critical 
view on NATO, towards the main U.S. allies and military intervention abroad, 
and refused to withdraw from NAFTA. 
It is no coincidence that businessmen in the White House were quickly re-
placed by the hawk-generals, and that U.S. military spending increased. Ac-
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cording to the SIPRI database, in 2016 U.S. military spending amounted to 
$611 billion (Tian et al. 2017). As for 2018, the Congress approved Trump’s 
$700 billion request for Pentagon budget (Blankenstein 2018).  
In the same line one should mention the return to unilateralism in foreign 
policy, as well as the return to hostility towards Russia, which promptly re-
placed the pre-election promises to improve relations with it. Under Trump the 
reduction of diplomatic contacts with Russia, begun under Obama, was contin-
ued with the closure of Russian consular facilities in New York, Washington, 
San Francisco, and Seattle as well as the U.S. General Consulate in St. Peters-
burg. In March 2018, 60 Russian diplomats were expelled from the U.S. in the 
wake of the notorious poisoning of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his 
daughter in the U.K. In February 2017 National Security Adviser Michael 
Flynn was replaced by “a hawk”, General Herbert R. Macmaster, who in turn 
was replaced in March 2018 by “the super-hawk” John Bolton, who had served 
Bush as Deputy State Secretary of State (2001-05) and as ambassador to the 
U.N. (2005-06). Bolton is known as a convinced opponent of the very idea of 
agreements with Russia. In February 2018, the relatively moderate Secretary of 
State Rex Tillerson, who had extensive business contacts in Russia (which, 
incidentally, did not affect his policy), was replaced by the hardliner Michael 
Pompeo. Although the Russian dossier was not the principal factor in Tiller-
son’s resignation – the main impetus was the contradictions between the Presi-
dent and Tillerson on Iran and North Korea – his removal will not contribute to 
a warming atmosphere in the relations between the U.S. and Russia. 
Trump did appoint some moderate officials. For example, he nominated Jon 
Huntsman, former ambassador to China and presidential candidate, as ambas-
sador in Moscow. The senior director for Russia in the National Security 
Council (NSC) is Fiona Hill, a Brookings Institution scholar who served on the 
NSC under Obama, and who is not seen as particularly sympathetic to Putin. 
Peter Rutland in commenting on these rearrangements notes that  
we see continuity in some of the most important and sensitive branches of the 
National Security Council – those dealing with Russia, nuclear weapons, and 
the Middle East. (Rutland 2017, 53)  
Having come to the White House as an opponent of the establishment in order 
“to return power to the people,” Trump evolved towards the traditional settings 
of the administration: the famous system of checks and balances is evidently 
able to correct the President’s arrogant policy. In the conflict between Trump 
and the administration one can see both primary and secondary motives. On 
one hand, Trump and the administration differ in their views as to what are the 
vital interests of the U.S. Trump is more focused on the conservative attitudes 
and interests of the U.S. white middle class. In the economy this means the 
return of the industrial facilities to the country; a reduction of U.S. contribu-
tions to NATO maintenance; and conservative attitudes towards social issues, 
while his opponents are more inclined to advance globalist ideas. However, 
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aside from policy disagreements, Trump’s personality also plays a role. His 
authoritarian habits and unpredictable behavior, his inexperience and his pro-
pensity for risky simplified decisions, especially in crisis situations inside and 
outside the country, are the cause for serious concern not only among liberals. 
The New York Times columnist Nick Kristof, assessing the results of Trump’s 
first 100 days in the White House, stated: 
Checks and balances have constrained Trump, courts have blocked his travel 
ban, journalists have provided oversight, and the public has hounded members 
of Congress. Alarm that the U.S. might slip into a fascist dictatorship has  
diminished – but it’s a long three years and nine months still ahead of us. 
(Kristof 2017)  
In turn, it seems that Trump is motivated not only by ideology, but also by an 
“instinct borne out of his own resentment of elites who, in his view, have never 
given him the respect he deserves” (Baker 2017).  
The above analysis characterizes Trump’s foreign policy during the first 
year of his presidency, when his main attention was focused on domestic policy 
issues due to the fierce struggle with opponents who hoped to justify his im-
peachment. Some stabilization of Trump’s position at the beginning of the 
second year of presidency allowed Trump to pay more attention to foreign 
policy, which became more and more unpredictable and clearly different from 
the policy of his predecessors. Trump has pulled out of several major interna-
tional treaties, has upset a G7 summit, offended his long-term Western Europe-
an allies, and has met Kim Jong-Un. All these steps break the traditional way of 
foreign policy-making. But at the moment it is too early to discuss foreign 
policy of Trump – there is still a lot of time ahead. 
Returning to discussing Bush and Obamas policies, we can talk about prox-
imity of the dominant approaches of different political elite segments – both 
Republican and Democratic – that determine the U.S. foreign policy at the 
beginning of the 21st century. Regardless of party affiliation and despite some 
differences on specific issues all of them share adherence to power use and 
offensive foreign policy in accordance with their understanding of U.S. nation-
al interests. This circumstance is especially prominently seen while comparing 
the foreign policies of Bush and Obama administrations. 
6. Has Bush a Chance to Stay an Aberration in American 
History? 
While analyzing Bush policy, John Higley wondered whether the Bush elite is 
an aberration or a harbinger of a new governance type in the U.S. (Higley 
2006). To answer this question one should scrutinize American foreign policy 
not only in the 21st century but in a longer historical perspective. In particular, 
it is worth mentioning the trend in the intra-elite relations that emerged during 
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the eight years of Clinton’s rule. During this period, the military, without pub-
lic scrutiny or debate, came to surpass its civilian leaders in resources and 
influence around the world (Priest 2004, 42). 
Spending on diplomacy continued the decline that began in the 1970s, while 
military spending increased, as it had done massively during the preceding 
Reagan and Bush Senior administrations. Tasks that were once civilian re-
sponsibilities were assigned to the military: clearing landmines; disrupting 
drug trafficking; countering terrorism; disaster relief; even allowing the mili-
tary’s powerful four-star regional commanders-in-chief to conduct diplomacy. 
(Higley 2006, 162) 
In 1998, Clinton initiated sustained bombing in Iraq’s “no-fly zones” and under 
heavy pressure from the elite that was gathering around George W. Bush, he 
made “regime change” in Iraq an official U.S. policy. Madeline Albright, while 
serving as Clinton’s ambassador to the U.N. and arguing for military interven-
tion to stop the bloodletting in Bosnia, had famously exclaimed to General 
Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “What’s the point of 
having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it” 
(Priest 2004, 52; Higley 2006, 163). In 1999, as Clinton’s Secretary of State, 
Albright championed “coercive diplomacy” against Milosevic and without 
approval by the U.N. Security Council Clinton initiated the 78-day bombing of 
Yugoslavia that led to Milosevic’s downfall. During their 2004 presidential 
campaign, Democratic candidates John Kerry and John Edwards criticized the 
Bush administration for rushing into war in Iraq, for mishandling Iraq’s subse-
quent occupation, for failures in reconstructing Afghanistan and hunting for 
Osama bin Laden. But they did not disavow their Senate votes for the Bush 
policies, they pledged to “stay the course” in Iraq and the wider “war on ter-
ror,” and the central thrust of their campaign was playing up Kerry’s military 
experience and toughness (Higley 2006). 
If we deal with the earlier period, it is pertinent to quote the results of at 
least two surveys that cover the foreign policy attitudes of American elites. One 
of the surveys was conducted by Andrew Bacevich (2005), another by and 
Gwen Moore and Stephanie Mack, From Vietnam to Iraq: American Elites’ 
Views on the Use of Military Force (2007). 
Bacevich argues that U.S. elites’ propensity to use force is not an exceptional 
policy of the Bush administration but is a long-term trend, at reaction against 
the post-Vietnam backlash against the use of military force (Bacevich 2005, 5-6). 
Bacevich argues that over the past twenty-five years an elite and public consen-
sus has emerged that “American military supremacy is an unqualified good” 
(Bacevich 2005, 15). After the Cold War, under Clinton, military spending fell 
by one third, but in the 2000s it rose again, meaning the U.S. preserved its role 
as the sole military superpower (Walker 2014). As Bacevich notes, in the re-
cent decades the U.S. has been using military force on a continual basis 
(Bacevich 2005, 19). In his later book Bacevich wrote that the U.S. was a “state 
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of national security,” where everything was subordinated to the aim of main-
taining the U.S. might in all the regions of the world. No U.S. government will 
dare to break with this historical tradition (Bacevich 2010, 109-45; see also 
Bacevich 2009, 2013). 
In the survey From Vietnam to Iraq: American Elites’ Views on the Use of 
Military Force (2007) Gwen Moore and Stephanie Mack analyzed the attitudes 
of American elites over the past three decades – from the end of U.S. military 
involvement in Vietnam in 1975 to 2004 during the “war on terror.” With data 
from quadrennial surveys of the U.S. elites’ foreign policy attitudes sponsored 
by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations since 1975, Moore and Mack 
learned whether elites had become more militaristic or whether such views had 
been a long term characteristic of the U.S. elites. The important advantage of 
this survey was that it covered a wide range of dimensions: the authors com-
pared attitudes of political and nonpolitical elites; of Republicans and Demo-
crats within the political elite; attitudes of elites inside and outside of the feder-
al government; trends in elite consensus or dissensus on the use of military 
force and trends over time and the extent of agreement between specific 
groups, including that of women and men elites.  
The surveys showed that U.S. leaders in and outside of government, as well 
as Republicans and Democrats and women and men in government, voiced 
overwhelming support for the use of American troops if necessary to defend 
their allies against invasion and to combat terrorism in 2000s. There were slight 
differences by sector, gender, and party on some measures, but the pattern is 
clear. In 1975, months after the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam, few 
leaders supported the use of military force abroad. In the three decades since, 
those anti-militaristic opinions have shifted to strong support for the use of 
military force in a variety of possible international situations. By 1986 most of 
the post-Vietnam reticence to use force had reversed. In general, opinions 
became more militant after 1986. These findings indicate a long term trend 
toward higher levels of approval among the U.S. leaders for the use of military 
force. Perhaps the anomaly was the temporary reluctance to do so after the 
Vietnam War. 
Systematic empirical surveys of elites’ views on militarism before 1975 re-
gretfully are not available. However, in this context we can quote C. Wright 
Mills who in the mid-1950s worried that the power elite had developed a mili-
tary view of reality:  
the American elite does not have any real image of peace–other than as an un-
easy interlude existing precariously by virtue of the balance of mutual fright. 
The only seriously accepted plan for ‘peace’ is the fully loaded pistol. (Mills 
1956, 185; see also Moore and Mack 2007)  
So, regretfully we can find few reasons to consider the U.S. political elites’ 
foreign policy attitudes at the turn of the 21st century to be an aberration 
among other U.S. political elite generation cohorts. Higley and Pakulski define 
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this type of the elite as leonine elites, not greatly dissimilar to the Bush elite 
and which may become the norm as the U.S. and other Western countries 
(Higley and Pakulski 2007). 
7.  The Roots of the Continuity in American Foreign Policy 
There are various possible explanations for the continuity of American foreign 
policy over time. First, one can note the stability of the institutional and deci-
sion-making system and mechanisms, which, in turn, are based on a stable 
system of interest representation, above all, of economically dominating inter-
ests. William Domhoff wrote about the mechanisms of the dominating inter-
ests’ translation to the political sphere:  
The corporate community’s ability to transform its economic power into poli-
cy influence and political access, along with its capacity to enter into a coali-
tion with middle-class social and religious conservatives, makes it the most 
important influence in the federal government. This combination of economic 
power, policy expertise, and continuing political success makes the corporate 
owners and executives a dominant class, not in the sense of complete and ab-
solute power, but in the sense that they have the power to shape the economic 
and political frameworks within which other groups and classes must operate. 
(Domhoff 2006, XIII-XIV; see also Domhoff et al. 2018; Harfst, Kubbe and 
Poguntke 2017) 
The second factor behind the stability of elite attitudes is the existence of 
formal and informal institutions that ensure the social and ideational cohesion 
of the elites. Higley argued that ruling elites in Western countries, including the 
USA, during the second half of the 20th century were  
enmeshed in extended circles and networks of political influence and personal 
acquaintance, that tied together several thousand of the uppermost figures in 
politics, government administration, business, trade unions, the media, and as-
sorted interest groups [...]. Through such circles and networks, individuals and 
factions, rose to executive power, osmosis-like, through lengthy careers in 
elective, party, administrative, and other politically relevant arenas. (Higley 
2006, 155; Higley 2016, ch. 3; Best and Higley 2018, ch. 21) 
Intra-elite cohesion is achieved within a wide range of social institutions: “gated 
neighborhoods, private schools, exclusive social clubs, debutante balls, and 
secluded summer resorts, nonprofit organizations – e.g., tax-free foundations, 
think tanks, and policy-discussion groups” and “a sense of group belonging, a 
‘we’ feeling” has been created (Domhoff 2006, XII-XIII). Several decades 
earlier C. Wright Mills describing relative unity of the American power elite, 
mentioned that it also rests upon “the similarity of origin and outlook, and the 
social and personal intermingling of the top circles from each of the hierar-
chies” (Mills 1956, 292).  
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Such a high level of interlocking of elites and the complexity of established 
institutions prevents radical innovations in political courses:  
Truculent congressional or parliamentary supporters had to be placated; politi-
cal debts incurred during the rise to power had to be paid; preparations for the 
next election tempered actions; the power of elites in other societal sectors had 
to be respected; the personal behaviors and political decisions of the ruling 
group were subject to intense media scrutiny and criticism. All in all, a single-
minded pursuit of political aims that broke sharply with what had gone before 
was exceedingly difficult. (Higley 2006, 155) 
American political culture is the third – the last but not the least – reason for 
the foreign policy continuity. At the core of U.S. political culture is a set of 
political and philosophical views that emerged by the mid-twentieth century on 
the basis of historical ideas that arose at the turn of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. Among the basic principles of American identity are the mes-
sianic ideas of the United States as “predestined” to serve as a kind of “beacon 
state” for the rest of the world. The U.S. global leadership is considered not 
only as the U.S. prior national interest, but also as unconditional good for the 
world. As Henry Kissinger noted, “no serious American maker of foreign poli-
cy can be oblivious to the traditions exceptionalism by which American de-
mocracy has defined itself” (Kissinger 2001, 20). Such national self-
consciousness automatically removes the question of the limits of American 
influence since the whole world becomes the zone of responsibility of the 
USA. The messianic political culture of the United States has had a significant 
impact on the institutional matrix within which the U.S. foreign policy is de-
veloped and implemented. Such views are the subject of society’s consensus 
and determine the consensual character of political elite.  
So, despite the significant differences in organizational structure and the 
foreign policy agenda among different elite groups, the U.S. foreign policy elite 
can be regarded as consensually united in terms of Higley’s approach because 
all elite groups share a general system of political beliefs and values, and 
recognition of the rules of the game. As Higley and Burton noted, a national 
elite is consensually unified when its members share a largely tacit consensus 
about rules and codes of political conduct amounting to a “restrained partisan-
ship” and participate in a more or less comprehensively integrated structure 
that provides them with relatively reliable and effective access to each other 
and to the most central decision-makers (Higley and Burton 2006, 19). This 
consensus argument may sound surprising, given the fierce disagreements 
between the Bush and Obama teams. But when one looks at their policies one 
finds more continuities than discontinuities, which is evidence for the consen-
sus hypothesis. 
Elite consensus does not prevent a sufficiently high level of diversity: the 
U.S. elite is certainly not a monolithic conglomerate. It is structurally and func-
tionally a complex system that includes the career bureaucracy of federal min-
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istries and departments, members of Congress in conjunction with bureaucratic 
and expert apparatus of the parliament, interest groups, securitocracy, the ex-
pert community, the media, think tanks, and other segments. However, being 
pluralistic in terms of structure, it is consolidated in term of values, ideology, 
and political culture. This circumstance is especially prominently visible while 
comparing the foreign policies of Bush and Obama administrations. 
Thus, the process of making foreign policy decisions appears as the interac-
tion of institutional and non-institutional factors (value systems, traditions, 
ideology, behavioral patterns) and converting the results into a practical course 
in accordance with political culture patterns and behavioral settings of the key 
figures. 
8.  Conclusion 
Comparison of the structure and foreign policy courses of the Bush and Obama 
administrations allows us to conclude that the mechanism of U.S. foreign poli-
cy making is largely impersonal. The key biographical parameters of the politi-
cians play only a limited role in defining political courses – the key factors are 
similar values, political attitudes, and political institutions that are based in turn 
on a stable system of interest representation. The institutional functionality and 
the consensual nature of the U.S. elite provide continuity to the policies of 
various administrations. American elites, being pluralistic in terms of structure, 
are consolidated in terms of adherence to the similar values and consensual 
political culture.  
During the second half of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st 
century, despite the differences in party adherence or any other affiliation, 
successive administrations followed similar or close guidelines while develop-
ing foreign policy. This continuity is a manifestation of the consensual nature 
of the U.S. political elite and is conditioned by the attitudes of the U.S. domi-
nating political culture. Among these attitudes are the prevailing conviction in 
the advisability of unilateralism in U.S. policy and U.S. dominance in global 
politics and economy, which are viewed not only as in the U.S.’s national in-
terest, but also as a goal, corresponding to a global “force for good.” The U.S. 
role is still treated in terms of exceptionality – as a “lighthouse” for the rest of 
the world. These attitudes and orientations are not coincidental – they them-
selves are the result of a complex interaction of a wide range of factors – insti-
tutional and individual, psychological and rational, systemic and random.  
The mechanism for making foreign policy decisions is a complex and inter-
nally dynamic, but highly stable system that includes institutional and non-
institutional factors. Among the non-institutional factors are certain beliefs, 
including exceptionalism and belief in a specific mission and specific vocation 
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of the U.S. as a “shining city on the hill,” while the institutional basis includes 
the system of interests representation.  
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